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Abstract 
The present paper addresses the role of the European Commission in shaping policy produced 
in the European Union. Most related studies have focussed on the Commission’s positions in 
legislative  or  executive  politics.  However,  there  appears  to  be  an  underresearched 
interrelation between the actions of the Commission in legislative and judicial policy-making 
that may form the basis for its continued influence. This paper therefore investigates the 
relationship  between  the  actions  of  the  European  Commission  in  legislative  and  judicial 
procedures  in  the  European  Union.  Given  the  extraordinary  success  of  the  European 
Commission before the European Court of Justice revealed by recent research, the question 
arises how the Commission uses its privileged position before the Court to influence policy 
development. It is hypothesised that the Commission exerts influence on policy production at 
the European level through both of these ‘modes of policy making’. I test my hypothesis by 
analysing Commission action in the field of social security. 
 Introduction: Influencing Policy Production in the European Union 
The role of the European Commission in shaping policy produced in the European Union has 
witnessed  much  scientific  attention.  Traditionally,  neo-functionalist  and 
intergovernementalist accounts of European integration have debated the question whether 
the Commission as a nominally independent institution exerts any real influence on policy 
outcomes  and  whether  it  acts  as  an  independent  “engine  of  integration”  contrary  to  the 
preferences of the member states. Recently, the increasing  employment of institutionalist 
approaches, in particular the principal-agent (P-A) framework, has refined our understanding 
of under what conditions the European Commission can pursue its preferred policy options 
(Tallberg  2000,  Pollack  2003).  Most  of  the  related  studies  have  focussed  on  the 
Commission’s positions in legislative procedures or policy areas in which the Commission 
has been delegated extensive executive powers, such as competition policy. However, there 
appears to be an underresearched interrelation between the actions of the Commission in 
different modes of policy-making that may form the basis for its continued influence. 
 
Revisiting one of his seminal articles, Fritz Scharpf recently called to attention three different 
modes of policy-making that he sees as central to European Union politics (Scharpf 2006). 
While the ‘intergovernmental mode’ of policy-making lies at the heart of his ‘joint decision 
trap’, he acknowledges a central position for the Commission in facilitating decision-making 
in the ‘joint-decision mode’, more commonly referred to as the ‘Community method’. As 
central  to  the  functioning  of  the  Union,  however,  Scharpf  identifies  a  ‘supranational-
hierarchical mode’ of policy-making in which the Commission makes use of its delegated 
powers as ‘guardian of the treaties’ by invoking Court rulings without resort to the Council or 
the Parliament. 
 
While the role of the European Court of Justice in European politics has witnessed growing 
attention in the political science literature, comparatively little attention has been paid to 
European institutions’ actions before the Court. This is particularly surprising with regard to 
the Commission, since it is widely known that the Commission participates in every case 
brought before the Court, either in direct litigation or through the lodging of observations in 
cases brought before the Court by other actors. Research has further shown the Commission 
to  be  highly  successful:  the  Court  follows  the  Commission’s  legal  opinion  in  the  vast 
majority  of  cases  (Conant  2007).  These  findings  pose  an  intriguing  question:  Given  the extraordinary  success  of  the  Commission  before  the  Court  of  Justice,  how  does  the 
Commission use this privileged position to influence policy development?  
 
In  one  of  the  few  treatments  of  this  phenomenon,  Susanne  K.  Schmidt  argues  that  the 
Commission  uses  legal  constraints  and  action  before  the  Court  of  Justice  to  influence 
legislative  decision-making  in  the  Council  by  applying  pressure  on  Council  positions 
(Schmidt 2000).  She argues  that  the  Commission  can  use the autonomy of the Court of 
Justice strategically to either change the preferences of some member states or change the 
default  condition  of  Council  voting.  I  extend  this  argument  by  pointing  out  that  the 
Commission may choose to completely circumnavigate legislation by using its privileged 
position  before  the  Court  to  achieve  policy  goals  that  seem  unlikely  to  be  successfully 
achieved – or only at high negotiation cost – through the legislative cycle. Based on this 
model, I will outline the position of the Commission in different modes of policy-making and 
indicate why in some cases it may be more attractive for the Commission to pursue a legal 
strategy than to initiate legislation. Drawing on a case study of the development of social 
security  regimes  for  migrant  workers  in  Europe,  the  paper  will  investigate  whether  the 
Commission pursues a long-term litigation strategy to influence the production of European 
legal norms outside or in combination with the legislative mode of policy-making. 
 
Strategy choice in policy-making 
Traditionally, the spheres of legislation and adjudication have been treated as analytically 
distinct. On closer inspection, however, this distinction becomes blurred. The production of 
binding  norms  is  central  to  both  processes;  in  this  regard  they  could  be  interpreted  as 
functionally equivalent. The interpretation of a norm in court is in most cases equivalent to a 
(quasi-legislative)  recasting  of  said  norm  with  universal  impact  and  future  relevance  as 
precedent  (Vanberg  2005:  184,  Shapiro  and  Stone  Sweet  2002:  90,  Dehousse  1998:  72, 
Dehousse and Weiler 1990: 246). The European Commission is situated as a central actor in 
both processes. It  is thus surprising  that  very little attention has so far been  paid  to the 
alternative strategies of influencing the production of legal norms that are at the disposal of 
the Commission.  
The paper hypothesises that the Commission can use litigation in much the same way that it 
uses its position in legislative processes to achieve its interests in European policy. Rather 
than  initiating  the  ‘ordinary’  process  of  policy-making  through  legislation  (strategy  A  in 
Figure 1 – the joint-decision mode), the Commission may choose to influence policy-making by initiating judicial proceedings before the Court of Justice (strategy B in Figure 1 – the 
supranational-hierarchical mode).  
 
Figure 1: Alternative strategies in policy-making in the EU 
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The joint-decision mode: initiating legislation 
Literature  analysing  legislative  processes  in  European  politics  has  highlighted  the 
Commission’s power to influence policy outcomes by using its position as agenda setter.
1 
This capacity is held to be greatest in policy areas where majority voting applies, since it is 
more costly for the Council to amend a Commission proposal than to adopt it (cf. Schmidt 
2000: 38; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Rather than having to account for all preferences in the 
Council, the Commission merely has to respect the preferences of the pivotal members of the 
Council (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001: 374). While the expansion of qualified majority voting 
thus increased the leeway for the Commission in initiating potentially successful legislation, 
the concomitant expansion of the involvement of the European Parliament in legislation has 
                                                
1 Alternatively, studies embracing Coasian negotiation theory have stressed the Commission’s role in lowering 
the transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining and facilitating consensual outcomes (Scharpf 2006: 850-
1).  
 rendered this procedure more complicated and curtailed its agenda-setting powers to some 
degree (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001: 374). The introduction of co-decision further amplified 
this trend (Tsebelis, Jensen et al. 2001). 
Moreover,  the  persistently  frequent  necessity  for  unanimous  decisions  in  the  Council 
deprives the Commission of much of its agenda-setting power, as in such situations it is 
equally costly for the Council to approve a Commission proposal as to amend it (cf. Tsebelis 
and Garrett 2001: 359; Schmidt 2000: 38). 
 
The supranational-hierarchical mode: initiating or intervening in judicial procedures 
Engaging in judicial proceedings on the other hand is in many respects less costly for the 
Commission than initiating legislation. The Commission has vast legal resources and enjoys a 
privileged position before the Court. The ‘Legal Service’ as the Commission’s ‘law firm’ 
employs  roughly  150  legal  experts  covering  all  policy  areas  within  the  Commission’s 
competences. Even where governments dispose of a specialised legal branch (such as the 
Austrian  ‘Verfassungsdienst’),  the  Commission  outnumbers  (in  terms  of  personnel)  the 
resources at the disposal of member states. The Commission furthermore acts as a privileged 
applicant, being able to initiate judicial proceedings and intervene (through observations) 
without the prior assent of the parties involved. It thus acts as the pivotal ‘repeat player’ 
(Galanter  1974)  in  judicial  proceedings  before  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  enjoying 
considerable advantages over other actors before the Court in both resources and experience. 
Both factors have been shown to be the prime predictors of success in court proceedings (cf. 
McGuire 1998). Empirical research on rulings of the European Court of Justice has shown 
that the Commission is indeed much more successful than other actors before the Court. 
While it must be taken into account that only a small percentage of infringement proceedings 
initiated by the Commission actually reach the Court of Justice – in most cases, the defendant 
and the Commission reach an agreement through negotiation before the Court is invoked
2 – 
“in the few cases in which [the Commission] invokes the Court in infringement procedures, 
its success rate is so high as to make the ECJ look like a kangaroo court – being the baby in 
the  pouch of the mother, it has to follow  wherever  the  Commission  goes” (Schepel and 
Blankenburg 2001: 18). 
                                                
2 Only about 10% of infringement proceedings reach the Court, with a judgement rendered in less than 4%. Note 
that there are marked differences in avoiding judicial proceedings between the member states; cf. Schepel and 
Blankenburg 2001: 17-18. Adding to this strategic advantage, initiating infringement procedures is exempted from the 
protracted and increasingly centralised requirement for Strategic Planning and Programming 
and Impact Assessment within the Commission. Such proceedings can be employed much 
more on an ad-hoc basis and are subject to fast-track inter-service consultations, whereas 
internal administrative hurdles may lead to bottlenecks in legislative initiatives (Tholoniat 
2009: 233-34).  
 
Initiating  infringement  proceedings  is  not  the  only  legal  strategy  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Commission.  While  both  Schmidt  and  Scharpf  concentrate  on  such  proceedings  in  their 
treatment of the Commission’s resort to the Court, this narrow focus overlooks the possibility 
to  influence  judicial  proceedings  through  the  lodging  of  observations  (similar  to  amicus 
curiae briefs in the US-American system; cf. Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997, Collins Jr. 2004, 
Nicholson  and  Collins  Jr.  2008)  in  cases  brought  before  the  Court  by  other  actors  –  in 
particular in preliminary rulings, which constitute roughly half of the Court’s caseload at any 
given time. While infringement proceedings usually bear some political weight, the impact of 
preliminary references should not be underestimated. In fact, the majority of cases cited with 
regard  to major  policy developments find their origin in such  references.
3 The European 
Commission lodges observations in all such procedures and enjoys a high success rate (cf. 
Conant 2007: 53; Mortelmans 1979).  
Looking at the internal workings of the Commission with regard to judicial proceedings, it 
also becomes apparent that the formulation of an intervention in preliminary references takes 
place  at  a  significantly  lower  level  within  the  Commission  hierarchy,  with  mainly  the 
responsible Directorate General (DG) and the Legal Service involved. The DG formulates a 
legal opinion to be lodged before the Court by the Legal Service. In some cases, differences 
arise between the Legal Service and the responsible DG, but mostly this process involves 
little  friction.  Infringement  proceedings  however  have  to  be  decided  at  the  apex  of  the 
Commission hierarchy, with at least a majority of Commissioners having to vote in favour.  
Paying attention to the systematic differences between different judicial proceedings affords 
more  detailed  insights  into  the  mechanisms  by  which  the  Commission  pursues  policy 
preferences through different modes of policy-making. It also opens up the perspective of the 
Commission as a unitary actor and allows for the observation of internal dynamics that may 
systematically influence strategy choices (cf. Hartlapp, Metz et al. 2008).  
                                                
3 One needs only to think of the famous ‘Costa v E.N.E.L.’ (case C-6/64) or ‘van Gend & Loos’ (case C-26/62).   
Finally, “all obstacles to European political action in the intergovernmental or joint-decision 
modes will also immunize judicial legislation against political correction” (Scharpf 2006: 
853). Court rulings are therefore difficult to override legislatively (and this would require a 
proposal  by  the  Commission),  becoming  ‘locked  in’  in  the  process.  Assuming  that  the 
Commission is interested in stable policy outcomes that are within its range of preferences, 
these factors should make judicial proceedings an attractive alternative to other modes of 
policy-making.  
 
Three Strategies 
Taking these observations a point of departure, I identify three potential strategies for the 
Commission to use Court proceedings for achieving policy goals. 
1)  The Commission can engage in Court proceedings to alter the status quo as default 
condition  for future  Council  voting.  The  Commission  thus  entices  legislation  that 
‘reels in’ a (too) far reaching Court decision but still moves the initial status quo in 
the direction desired by the Commission. Susanne Schmidt calls this option the ‘lesser 
evil’ strategy (Schmidt 2000: 42-44)
4. 
2)  The Commission may also use the opposite strategy: it can initiate legislation, the 
content of which it then challenges in Court (by favouring a ‘broad interpretation’) to 
move it in ‘post-factum’ in the desired direction. I call this the ‘legislate-then-litigate’ 
strategy. 
3)  The Commission may use Court proceedings to influence policy outcomes in its own 
right without resorting to the legislative cycle where doing so appears more costly. 
This  strategy  should  particularly  occur  where  legislative  policy  making  is  at  its 
costliest – with co-decision and unanimity in the Council. I call this the ‘litigate only# 
strategy. 
 
I now turn to a case study of activities of the Commission in the area of social policy to put 
this model to an empirical test. 
 
                                                
4 Susanne Schmidt uses this term to refer to a strategy whereby the Commission may use the threat of resorting 
to Court proceedings – without actually resorting to he Court – to enhance its position in the legislative process 
by credibly threatening to alter the status quo as default condition and therefore entice the Council to adopt a 
Commission proposal that does not coincide with its position vis-à-vis the initial status quo. I have adapted this 
proposition for my model.  The case study – coordinating social security for migrant workers 
While seemingly a highly technical issue, the coordination of social security schemes for 
migrant workers presents an interesting testing ground for the alternative strategies at the 
disposal of the Commission in influencing policy. Social security schemes touch upon central 
aspects of national welfare systems and should therefore be of high relevance to the member 
states. As a highly dynamic field it has frequently faced pressure to adapt to altered realities 
in light of increasingly sophisticated welfare regimes.  
An analysis of the development of the coordination scheme for social security pertaining to 
migrant workers in some ways represents a ‘most likely case’ scenario for the assumptions 
outlined above.  Legislative procedures in social security  issues  are  characterised by  high 
negotiation  costs.  Decision-making  in  the  Council  requires  unanimity;  the  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam  moreover  introduced  the  European  Parliament  as  a  veto  player  with  the  co-
decision procedure (art. 42 TEC). As outlined, unanimity in the Council also deprives the 
Commission of much of its agenda-setting power. According to the model, high negotiation 
costs in legislation paired with the lack of agenda setting power should create incentives for 
the Commission to pursue a litigation strategy – following the ‘supranational-hierarchical 
mode’ of policy-making – to achieve its policy preferences. The litigation option should be 
particularly attractive since high negotiation costs lead to an equally high rigidity of rules 
once cast. The status quo thus becomes locked in, with ECJ decisions interpreting (and thus 
altering) the status quo costly to legislatively overrule. The model would thus run into serious 
trouble if no corroborating evidence is found in the present study. 
 
The domain in question is subject to frequent proceedings of the legislative and the judicial 
kind. Regulation 1408/71, which serves as the basis of the coordination regime, alone has 
been amended over 40 times – sometimes substantially – while the scheme has been subject 
to more than 550 preliminary references and 35 infringement proceedings.
5 Moreover, the 
revealed preferences of the Commission and the member states in this regard are markedly 
disparate. While member states frequently argue for a narrow definition of the scope of the 
regulation, the Commission tends to favour a broad application. The relatively low number of 
infringement proceedings lodged by the Commission
6 highlights the need to take into account 
the  large  number  of  preliminary  references  lodged  by  national  courts.  These  judicial 
                                                
5 Calculated on the basis of a dataset compiled by Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas Brunell (2006) in the context 
of the NewGov project; cf. http://www.eu-newgov.org/datalists/deliverables_detail.asp?Project_ID=26. 
6 It should be noted that stated number only refers to infringement proceedings that have ended up in court. proceedings – even though not directly initiated by the Commission itself – do indeed present 
a viable avenue of influence that is actively used by the Commission – bearing in mind that 
the Commission acts as amicus curiae in all of these cases.  
 
Provisions on the coordination of social security schemes for migrant workers follow the 
principal aim of ensuring the free movement of workers within the Common Market. Art. 39-
42 TEC which govern this domain are thus of central relevance to legislative and judicial 
proceedings in this regard. In particular, art. 42 TEC imposes on the member states the duty 
to „adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of 
movement for workers” to guarantee both the consideration and addition of entitlements to 
benefits acquired in different member states as well as the receipt of social security benefits 
in the member state of residence. One of the first regulations of the European Economic 
Community (regulation 3/58) followed the requirement of art. 42 TEC to establish such a 
coordination  system  and,  recast  as  regulation  1408/71,  serves  as  the  basis  for  this 
coordination  until  today.
7  The  development  of  this  coordination  scheme  has  witnessed  a 
central involvement of the Commission in defining the scope of its applicability.  
 
While  the  European  provisions  for  the  coordination  of  social  security  schemes  do  not 
represent a novelty in international law, they have created a dense system of rules on the 
European  level  that  necessitate  constant  updating  to  suit  the  needs  of  sophisticated  and 
rapidly evolving welfare states. Central and recurring point of contention is the definition of 
the matters covered by the regulation. Central to this conflict is the distinction between social 
assistance benefits (defined as services of general interest based on individual need at the 
discretion of the institution providing the benefits) and social security schemes (defined as 
benefits to which a right has acquired through individual contribution). While both domains 
were fairly neatly separable at the end of the 1950s (the time of the first regulation), the 
increasing sophistication of national welfare policy has since blurred the lines between social 
assistance  (excluded  from  coordination)  and  social  security  (subject  to  coordination).  A 
detailed  definition  of  the  two  sectors  was  however  omitted  from  the  regulation.  The 
coordination scheme thus had to grapple with benefits bearing characteristics of both types, 
in particular so called ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’. The court had identified this 
problem at an early stage: “Whilst it may seem desirable from the point of view of applying 
                                                
7 A new regulation 883/2004 replacing 1408/71 is due to take effect in late 2009.  this  regulation  to  establish  a  clear  distinction  between  legislative  schemes  that  fall 
respectively within social security and assistance, one cannot exclude the possibility that by 
reason of the persons covered, its objectives and its method of application, a legislation can 
come close to both these categories, thus preventing any comprehensive classification” (case 
C-24/74, ‘Biason’, para 9). It was therefore necessary to find a solution to the question of 
how to deal with such ‘hybrid’ benefits.  
The European Commission and the member states reached opposite conclusions. While the 
member  states  favoured  narrow  interpretations,  the  European  Commission  saw  itself  as 
safeguarding the free movement of workers by favouring an inclusion into the coordination 
schemes of a wide range of welfare instruments. Since existing legislation did not sufficiently 
address this question, additional policy-making was required. A court case acted as a catalyst 
in this development. In ‘Piscitello’, the Court invalidated an Italian legal norm which allowed 
Italian authorities to withhold a social aid pension, designed to guarantee a minimum income 
to pensioners and classifiable as a  ‘hybrid’ benefit, from recipients living outside Italian 
territory.
8  The  inclusion  of  such  ‘special  non-contributory  benefits’  in  the  coordination 
scheme (which mandates the exportability of benefits) was highly contested and substantially 
opposed by the member states.  
 
The  Commission  subsequently  (in  1985)  drafted  a  proposal  for  a  Council  regulation  in 
response to the Court ruling, amending regulation 1408/71 with the aim of including hybrid 
benefits in the system of coordination, however making the exportability of these benefits 
subject to national legislation.
9 Despite the swift approval of the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee in the consultation procedure the same year, the Council – 
being unable to reach consensus on the inclusion of hybrid benefits into the coordination 
scheme – did not act on the proposal.  
Facing  the  inaction  of  the  Council,  the  Commission  in  1988  decided  to  reactivate  an 
infringement  procedure  against  the  French  Republic  which  it  had  initiated  in  1979  with 
regard to the French authorities’ refusal to export a ‘supplementary allowance’ (a hybrid 
benefit) but had suspended in 1981 to allow for Community legislation.
10 While the adoption 
of the proposed regulation by the Council would have ended the infringement procedure (as 
the  regulation  in  question  would  have  exempted  the  benefit  from  exportability),  the 
                                                
8 Cf. case C-139/82, ‘Piscitello’. The judgement in this case is dated 5 May 1983. 
9 Cf. COM(1985) 396 final. The proposal was transmitted to the council on 8 August 1985.   
10 Cf. case C-236/88, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. Commission insisted on the applicability of the provisions of Community law in force as long 
as the new regulation was not decided upon. The Court followed this opinion in its judgement 
and ordered the exportability of the benefit.  
 
Figure 2: Timeline leading to the adoption of regulation 1247/92 
1979 1983 1990 1985 1988 1992 1991
Proposal by the Commission 
to amend regulation 1408/71 
with the aim of including 
hybrid benefits in the system 
of coordination, however 
restricting the exportability of 
these benefits
Council adopts 
Commission proposal 
mainly unchanged
Judgement of the Court in 
‚Piscitello‘, including a ‘special 
non-contributory benefit’ in the 
coordination scheme and 
ordering exportability
Commission initiates an 
infringement procedure against 
the French Republic with the
aim of including a ‘special non-
contributory benefit’ in the 
coordination scheme, later 
(1981) suspended to allow for 
legislation
Commission brings the
infringement procedure against 
the French Republic, 
suspended earlier, to Court.
Judgement of the Court in 
‚Commission of the European 
Communities v French 
Republic’, including a ‘special 
non-contributory benefit’ in the 
coordination scheme and 
ordering exportability
Judgement of the Court in 
‘Newton’, following the 
Commission’s legal opinion,
including a ‘special non-
contributory benefit’ in the 
coordination scheme and 
ordering exportability
 
Moreover, in 1989 the Commission lodged an observation in ‘Newton’
11, another case in 
which the applicability of the coordination scheme to a ‘special non-contributory benefit’ and 
hence its exportability was disputed. In this observation, the Commission again argued that 
since  the  Council  had  not  acted  upon  its  proposal,  which  would  have  prevented  the 
exportability of the contested measure while including it in the coordination scheme, the 
current status quo of legislation would have to be observed.
12 Hence, following previous 
case-law,  the  ‘mobility  allowance’  in  question would  have  to  be  interpreted  as  a  hybrid 
benefit  and  thus  judged  exportable.  The  Court  followed  this  opinion,  disregarding 
observations to the contrary lodged by the governments of Belgium and the United Kingdom.  
                                                
11 Cf. Judgement of the Court in case C-356/89, ‘Newton’. 
12 Cf. Opinion of the Advocate General in case C-356/89, ‘Newton’ para 24. Less  than  a  year  after  the  judgement  in  ‘Newton’,  the  Council,  seven  years  after  the 
Commission’s  proposal,  adopted  the  proposed  regulation  (1247/92)  mainly  unchanged, 
merely emphasising the non-exportability of hybrid benefits.  
 
Modelling this situation in a one-dimensional policy space, the situation can be depicted as 
follows.  
 
Figure 3: Changing the status quo through judicial proceedings and legislation  
 
 
The  status  quo  (SQ)  of  regulation  1408/71  with  regard  to  the  matters  covered  by  the 
coordination  regime  (social  security  benefits  included,  social  assistance  excluded)  is 
challenged  (both  by  private  actors  through  preliminary  references  and  the  Commission 
through infringement procedures) when applied to ‘hybrid benefits’. The Council favours a 
narrow  interpretation  (the  exclusion  of  hybrid  benefits  from  coordination)  whereas  the 
Commission  favours  a  broad  interpretation  (the  inclusion  of  hybrid  benefits  in  the 
coordination regime). A Commission proposal (COM) is not acted upon by the Council. The 
Commission engages in judicial proceedings and succeeds in moving the status quo in the 
desired direction (but beyond its own ideal point COM) to SQ’. The Council then acts on the 
Commission proposal and moves the status quo to the Commission’s ideal point (COM), 
which, to the Council, is preferable to SQ’.  
Council 
SQ 
COM 
SQ’ 
ECJ 
Court ruling (following 
Commission legal opinion) 
Legislation The  Commission  thus  employed  judicial  proceedings  to  alter  the  status  quo  in  a  point 
undesirable to the Council, only to later ‘reel it in’ by legislation. The Commission thus 
applies pressure on the Council position without merely resolving to threat. The situation thus 
goes beyond the ‘lesser evil’ strategy employed by the Commission described by Schmidt 
(Schmidt 2000: 50). 
 
While  the  Commission  supported  this  solution  in  a  series  of  ensuing  court  cases,  it 
subsequently revealed a preference to interpret the rights of migrant workers wider than the 
status quo resulting from regulation 1247/92. This became apparent in its intervention in 
‘Jauch’.
13 Its observation lodged in this case aimed at limiting member states’ leeway in 
classifying benefits as ‘hybrid’ and implicitly called into question the validity of the non-
exportability of hybrid benefits set down in the recent regulation by highlighting the principle 
of  non-discrimination.  It  upheld  the  view  that  the  Austrian  ‘care  allowance’  in  question 
should  not  automatically  by  classified  as  a  hybrid  benefit  only  because  the  Austrian 
government had listed it as such in the appropriate section of regulation 1408/71.
14 The Court 
followed this view against the interventions of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom.
15 According to its judgement, national governments cannot merely declare 
a benefit to be ‘special non-contributory’ and therefore exempt it from exportability, but the 
benefit  must  also  accord  to  a  number  of  conditions  which  the  Court  itself  proceeded  to 
define.  
The Commission subsequently took up the judgement of the Court in ‘Jauch’ in a proposal 
for a regulation
16 amending the existing coordination scheme to take account of the criteria 
for interpreting what constitutes a ‘special non-contributory benefit’ laid down by the Court. 
It assessed the benefits listed as hybrid in regulation 1408/7
17 according to these criteria and 
proposed some changes.  
The Council, however, was unable to agree on the Commission’s assessment of the benefits 
in question.
18 In particular, the governments of the United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland 
contested the deletion of some of their entries from the list of hybrid benefits and insisted on 
                                                
13 Cf. case C-215/99, ‘Jauch’.  
14 Cf. Opinion of the Advocate General in case C-215/99, ‘Jauch’, para 42-50. 
15 The Dutch government in particular argued that “proper account must be taken of the authority of the Member 
States to organise their own systems of social security”, cf. Opinion of the Advocate General in case C-215/99, 
‘Jauch’, para 36.  
16 Cf. COM(2003) 468 final. 
17 The regulation since 1992 contains an Annex IIa which includes a list of benefits claimed by the national 
governments to be special non-contributory.  
18 Cf. COM(2004) 752 final: 3.  their  retention.  Subsequently,  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  adopted  the 
Commission  proposal  as  regulation  647/2005,  amending  it  suit  the  objections  of  said 
governments, while the Commission reserved the right to refer the matter to the Court of 
Justice and to present a new proposal, if necessary, to revise the list of entries based on the 
findings of the Court.
19  
Only weeks after its adoption, the Commission made use of this right and filed an action for 
annulment  against  the  regulation  on  the  grounds  that  the  British,  Swedish  and  Finish 
government had declared benefits as hybrid that did not match the criteria laid down by the 
Court in ‘Jauch’.
20 The Court once again followed the Commission’s opinion against the 
interventions of the Parliament, the Council, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland and 
deleted the contested benefits from the list of ‘special non-contributory benefits’.  
 
Figure 4: Timeline leading to regulation 647/2005 
1999 2005 2003 2008
Council adopts Commission 
proposal with some
amendments to which the
Commission objects
Commission proposal to amend 
the existing coordination 
scheme to take into account 
the Court’s ruling in ‘Jauch’
Commission intervenes in 
‘Jauch’ with the aim of limiting 
member states’ leeway in 
classifying benefits as ‘hybrid’. 
The judgement of the Court 
follows this opinion.
Commission subsequently files 
action for annulment against 
the regulation 
Judgement of the Court in 
’Commission of the European 
Communities v European 
Parliament and Council of the 
European Union’. The 
judgement follows the 
Commission’s legal opinion, 
deleting Council amendments.
 
 
                                                
19 Cf. COM(2004) 752 final: 4.  
20 Cf. case C- 299/05, ’Commission of the European Communities v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union’.   Modelling this situation in a one-dimensional policy space, the situation can be depicted as 
follows  (see  Figure  5):  The  Commission  challenges  the  status  quo  (SQ)  established  by 
Council regulation 1247/92 with regard to the member states’ leeway in declaring benefits as 
‘hybrid’. After an initial success in ‘Jauch’, it proposes legislation to take into account the 
Court  ruling.  The  Council  adopts  this  proposal  with  some  amendments  (SQ’).  The 
Commission subsequently challenges this legislation in Court and succeeds in getting the 
amendments to its proposal deleted, moving the status quo beyond the favoured Council 
position even after legislation (to COM).  
The Commission thus uses judicial proceedings to achieve policy it had been unable to bring 
about through the legislative cycle. Rather than withdraw its proposal from the legislative 
process, its challenges the adopted legislation to move the status quo to its desired position – 
employing what I have called the ‘legislate-then-litigate’ strategy.  
 
 
Figure 5: Changing the status quo through legislation and judicial proceedings  
 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis has shown that the Commission indeed uses different strategies of influencing 
policy. It frequently combines the ‘joint-decision mode’ and the ‘supranational hierarchical 
mode’ of policy-making. The case study has further shown that the legal strategy employed 
by the Commission is not restricted to direct action (i.e. initiating infringement proceedings) 
Council 
SQ  SQ’ 
COM 
Court ruling (following 
Commission legal opinion) 
Legislation following 
Court ruling in ‚Jauch’ but influence can be exerted through preliminary reference procedures. In its observations, 
the  Commission  has  frequently  argued  for  a  wide  interpretation  of  the  scope  of  the 
coordination scheme. The Court has followed this option regularly.  
The  findings  indicate  a  close  linkage  between  legislative  and  judicial  proceedings.  It  is 
possible to identify a pattern in which the Commission proposes legislation and follows it up 
with litigation either before the actual adoption by the Council (and the Parliament) or after 
its adoption in the light of perceived deficits. It is important to notice that the Commission 
does  not  merely  threaten  litigation  to  speed  up  the  process  of  legislation  and  move  the 
outcome towards its own preferences (Schmidt 2000: 42-44), but actually does litigate and 
move  the  status  quo  in  the  desired  direction  regardless  of  the  stage  of  legislation.  Both 
strategies  therefore  appear  mutually  reinforcing,  rather  than  alternative  or  subsidiary. 
Preliminary references play a major role in this regard. Given the steadily high caseload 
before the Court in this domain, the Commission does not have to induce judicial proceedings 
itself but can use those cases already brought before the Court by other actors to present its 
policy preferences (cast as legal opinion) to the Court.  
The case study has shown no incidence of the Commission using judicial proceedings in their 
own right, with legislative proposals entirely absent (the ‘litigate-only’ strategy). While this 
study does not warrant a dismissal of this strategy, it is uncertain whether the theoretical 
possibility of this strategy is also and empirical fact. Judging by the results from this limited 
case study, I tentatively conclude that legislation may be regarded as the ‘appropriate’ way of 
policy making, with litigation as a tool to influence the direction of its outcome. Comparative 
studies are required to indicate whether this is a characteristic of the domain of social security 
or whether this pattern can be found in other policy areas as well. 
Comparative  research  will  also  have  to  establish  the  exact  condition  under  which  the 
Commission is more likely to choose one strategy over the other or whether they are indeed 
complimentary in all policy fields. An analysis of Commission action in diverse policy fields 
should serve to establish whether there is a cost factor involved in strategy choice. Following 
rationalist  assumptions,  the  Commission  should  display  a  greater  preference  for  judicial 
proceedings where the cost of legislation is high (i.e. the difference in preferences between 
the Commission and the Council (or within the Council itself) is great and the number of veto 
players is large).  
There is sufficient  initial evidence to  suggest that the Commission’s  influence  on policy 
development  is  safeguarded  by  its  central  position  in  several  different  modes  of  policy-making.  Further  research  can  thus  contribute  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  concrete 
interrelationship of these different modes.  
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